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Abstract
This paper introduces algorithm instance games (AIGs) as a conceptual
classification applying to games in which outcomes are resolved from joint
strategies algorithmically. For such games, a fundamental question asks:
How do the details of the algorithm’s description influence agents’ strategic
behavior?
We analyze two versions of an AIG based on the set-cover optimization
problem. In these games, joint strategies correspond to instances of the
set-cover problem, with each subset (of a given universe of elements) repre-
senting the strategy of a single agent. Outcomes are covers computed from
the joint strategies by a set-cover algorithm. In one variant of this game,
outcomes are computed by a deterministic greedy algorithm, and the other
variant utilizes a non-deterministic form of the greedy algorithm. We char-
acterize Nash equilibrium strategies for both versions of the game, finding
that agents’ strategies can vary considerably between the two settings. In
particular, we find that the version of the game based on the deterministic
algorithm only admits Nash equilibrium in which agents choose strategies
(i.e., subsets) containing at most one element, with no two agents picking
the same element. On the other hand, in the version of the game based
on the non-deterministic algorithm, Nash equilibrium strategies can include
agents with zero, one, or every element, and the same element can appear
in the strategies of multiple agents.
1 Introduction
Since its inception, the field of algorithmic game theory has explored the conse-
quences of placing algorithms in strategic settings. In this article, we take up a
thread that can be traced through the tapestry of AGT research but – to the
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best of our knowledge – has not previously been explicitly identified. At its core,
this thread involves settings in which outcomes are derived from joint strategies
algorithmically. In these settings, joint strategies may be viewed as instances that
are passed to an algorithm tasked with returning outcomes, and the description
of the game itself is tied to the (possibly implicit) use of a specific algorithm. To
highlight the algorithm’s role, we refer to these games as algorithm instance games
(AIGs).
Consider a hiring game in which there is a single employer and M candidates.
Suppose that there is a set U of all possible skills, and each candidate i must
invest in acquiring a subset Si ⊂ U of these skills. Skills are costly, with each
one costing a fixed amount α > 0. The candidates each submit a resume listing
their skills, and the employer hires a subset of candidates, C ⊂ M , that has the
broadest collective skill set but with the fewest number of individual candidates. If
a candidate i is hired, they receive a reward β > 0 less the cost spent on acquiring
the skill set Si; otherwise, candidate i receives no reward but is still out the cost
sunk into acquiring their skill set. From the perspective of the employer, the hiring
game is clearly equivalent to the set-cover optimization problem: presented with
a collection of skill (sub)sets (i.e., the candidates’ resumes), select the fewest can-
didates who collectively cover the most skills. Because the hiring game’s outcomes
are computed algorithmically, and the realized outcome for a given joint strategy
may be differ according to exactly which set-cover algorithm is used, a complete
description of the hiring game must include a description of the algorithm used by
the employer.
For example, consider a hiring game in which there are three skills, U =
{e1, e2, e3}, and four candidates with skill sets S1 = {e1, e2}, S2 = {e2, e3},
S3 = {e3}, and S4 = {e1}. In this case, there are three equally optimal (from
the perspective of the employer) covers1 and which of these outcomes is realized
will in general vary between one algorithm and another depending on the algo-
rithm’s internal decision making. More to the point, the algorithm’s decisions will
influence agents’ strategy selections. Accordingly, a central research question mo-
tivating our research into AIGs asks: How does the implementation of the AIG’s
algorithm influence strategic decision making?
In this paper, we examine the set-cover instance game (SCIG), an AIG based
on the (unweighted) NP-complete set-cover problem (and equivalent to the hiring
game example given above). We characterize Nash equilibrium strategies for two
variants of the SCIG, each based on a version of the greedy set-cover approxi-
mation algorithm (for a performance analysis of the greedy algorithm, see [HP98]
and the surveys [Hoc97, Vaz01, WS11]). Both greedy algorithm iteratively builds
a solution by selecting the subset with the most as yet uncovered elements, and
1The three optimal covers are Ca = {S1, S2}, Cb = {S1, S3}, and Cc = {S2, S4}.
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is guaranteed to return a cover that is at most a logarithmic factor worse than
the optimal (i.e., minimal-cardinality) cover. The two versions of the greedy algo-
rithm that we analyze correspond to deterministic and non-deterministic versions.
In the deterministic version, the algorithm iterates following a fixed ordering of
the subsets (that is known to the agents); and in the non-deterministic version,
the algorithm iterates over the subsets following a uniform random permutation.
Stated in terms of the hiring game, the two versions of the greedy algorithm
can be thought of as follows: in the deterministic version, the employer always
looks through the candidates’ applications in alphabetical order, while in the non-
deterministic version, the employer first shuffles the candidates’ applications and
then looks though it in which ever order happened to come out of this shuffling.
1.1 Discussion and Related Work
Interpreted loosely, pretty much any game could be considered an AIG. After all,
a giant lookup table that maps joint strategies to outcomes could be considered
an algorithm. However, it is our intention that AIGs be construed more narrowly,
reserving the designation for settings in which an understanding of the algorithmic
aspects of the outcome resolution function that maps joint strategies to outcomes
offers fundamental insights. For instance, one can define an AIG based on a
combinatorial search or optimization problem and a corresponding search or op-
timization algorithm, just as we do in this paper with the SCIG. Another one
could define an AIG based on an algorithm that simulates the decision making
procedures of an individual or organization. Or, an AIG could be based on the
implementation of a game theoretic mechanism that uses an approximation al-
gorithm to determine outcomes. Our motivation for conceiving the designation
“algorithm instance game” is to identify a natural, algorithmic perspective that
has previously gone unidentified (in any general sense) in the algorithmic game
theory literature, and we believe that this perspective will be of broader interest
to the algorithmic game theory community.
A number of existing mechanisms and games have characteristics that we be-
lieve qualify them as AIGs. For example, consider the winner determination prob-
lem (WDP) for combinatorial auctions. The WDP is an optimization problem
in which an algorithm (the mechanism) is given a bidding profile and must com-
pute a feasible allocation of goods maximizing social welfare (cf., [LMS06]). The
utility for an individual agent depends on the allocation they receive from the
mechanism. In its full generality, the WDP problem presents a number of dif-
ficult computational challenges including the representation of bids [Nis06] and
the computational complexity of finding the optimal allocation [RPH98] (see also
[BN07]). Special cases of the WDP corresponding to classic NP-hard optimiza-
tion problems like integer linear programs and the knapsack problem have been
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studied algorithmically; for example, Bartal et al. [BGN03] established inapprox-
imability bounds on the social welfare of WDP mechanisms and Zurel and Nissan
[ZN01] and Lehmann et al. [LLN06] analyze a WDP mechanism based on a greedy
approximation algorithm.
The PageRank game, studied by Hopcroft and Sheldon [HS07, HS08], can cer-
tainly be deemed an AIG, and their approach to analyzing the game’s best-response
strategies is consistent with the AIG perspective. In this network formation game,
agents correspond to nodes and their strategies are sets of directed edges (from
themselves to others). An agent’s utility is proportional to their PageRank in the
network comprised of all of the agents’ directed links. In their equilibrium analysis,
the authors find that an agent’s best response is to only build links to those other
agents whom link directly to them (i.e., to reciprocate incoming links). Their
result supports some well-known search engine optimization techniques (e.g., link
spam), and in so doing demonstrates an inadequacy of the PageRank algorithm
as a reputation mechanism since it incentivizes agents to strategically build links
that are inconsistent with the reputation system’s objectives.
Finally, a number of covering games have appeared in the algorithm game
theory literature in recent years[BLENO08, CH10, EGM10, PVV12, BBM13]. Al-
though they are based on covering problems like set-cover, the work presented in
these papers has little in common with AIGs or the SCIG presented in the current
paper. Typically, agents in these covering games correspond to elements in the
universal set, and the subsets are given as part of the specification of the game.
An agent’s strategy then corresponds to a selection of subsets containing their
element, and the joint strategy induces a covering of the agents/elements. The
distinction is that, in these covering games, joint strategies correspond to solu-
tions to a covering problem, whereas in our work, the joint strategies correspond
to instances of a covering problem.
1.2 Summary of Results
Our main analytical results are concerned with characterizing pure strategy Nash
equilibrium for the two versions of the SCIG based on the greedy algorithm. We
find that the two algorithms can result in Nash equilibrium that are considerably
different. In the SCIG based on the deterministic greedy algorithm, all Nash
equilibrium strategies involve agents choosing at most one element, with no two
agents choosing the same element. On the other hand, in the version of the SCIG
based on the non-deterministic greedy algorithm, Nash equilibrium strategies can
include agents with zero, one, or all |U| elements. Moreover, if the equilibrium
includes one agent choosing every element of U in their strategy, there must be
at least one other agent that also chooses every element of U in their strategy.
When the equilibrium strategy includes an agent with only one element, then
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there cannot simultaneously be another agent with more than one element in
their strategy. Our main findings are summarized in Theorems 1 and 3 for the
deterministic and non-deterministic versions of the SCIG, respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the SCIG
model and Section 3 presents our analysis of Nash equilibrium for the deterministic
(§ 3.1) and non-deterministic (§ 3.1) versions of the game. The paper concludes
with some final remarks in Section 4.
2 Model
The set-cover instance game (SCIG) is an instance game that is derived from
the set-cover combinatorial optimization problem. Recall that an instance 〈U ,S〉
of the set-cover problem consists of a universe of elements U = {e1, . . . , en} and
a collection of subsets S = {S1, . . . , Sm} where each Si is a subset of U . The
objective is to find a minimal cardinality collection C ⊆ S that covers all of the
elements in U ; i.e., U =
⋃
S∈C C.
In the SCIG, agents’ strategies correspond to subsets of the universe of ele-
ments, U . Let M = {1, . . . , m} denote the set of m strategic agents. For each
agent i ∈M , S i = P(U) defines i’s strategy space,
2 where a pure strategy Si ∈ Si
is a (possibly empty) subset of U . Let S = S1×· · ·×Sm denote the joint strategy
space, with a joint strategy S = (S1, . . . , Sm) ∈ S representing a collection of m
subsets. A joint strategy S and a (possibly truncated) universal set U ′ =
⋃
i∈M Si
designates an instance 〈U ′,S〉 of the set-cover problem. To simplify our nota-
tion, we will sometimes use S to refer to both the joint strategy and the set-cover
instance that it represents.
To finish the description of the SCIG, we need to specify a set-cover algorithm,
A. This algorithm is responsible for producing outcomes from joint strategy pro-
files. That is, given a joint strategy S, the algorithm returns a cover C ← A(U ′,S),
and agents’ utilities are then calculated with respect to this cover. Formally, given
the joint strategy S, the utility for agent i ∈M is defined as
ui(S) = β1(Si ∈ C)− α|Si|, (1)
where C is the cover returned by the algorithm A given the set-cover instance S;
β > 0 and α > 0 are exogenously specified parameters (constants) that convey the
benefit of being selected in the cover (β) and the cost of including elements in a
strategy (α); and 1(X) is an indicator function that equals one when condition X
is true and equals zero otherwise.
If A is a non-deterministic algorithm, then it will not necessarily return a
unique cover for a given instance. Let C(S) be a random variable that takes as
2P(X) denotes the power-set of X ; i.e., the set of all possible subsets of X .
5
Algorithm 1 Greedy set-cover algorithm.
Require: U = {e1, . . . , en} is a universe of elements.
Require: S = {S1, . . . , Sm} with Si ⊆ U for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} is a collection of
subsets.
Require: U =
⋃
Si∈S
Si.
1: function G(U ,S)
2: C ← ∅
3: U ′ ← U
4: π ← permute(1, . . . , m)
5: while U ′ 6= ∅ do
6: S∗ ← Spi(1)
7: for i = 2, 3, . . . , m do
8: if |S∗ ∩ U ′| < |Spi(i) ∩ U
′| then
9: S∗ ← Spi(i)
10: U ′ ← U ′ \ S∗
11: C ← C ∪ {S∗}
12: return C
13: end function
Figure 1: In the deterministic version, Gd, the permutation in line 4 is restricted
to π(i) = i, for all i = 1, . . . , m. In the non-deterministic version, Gn, the permu-
tation π is chosen uniformly at random from all permutations of 1, . . . , m.
values the covers returned by A given the instance S, with Pr[C(S) = C] being
the probability that a particular cover C is returned. For a joint strategy S, the
probability that an agent i’s strategy Si is part of a cover returned by the algorithm
is
Pr[Si ∈ C(S)] =
∑
C∈C(S)
1(Si ∈ C) Pr[C(S) = C].
We define the (expected) utility for an agent i ∈ M given a joint strategy S and
a non-deterministic algorithm A as
ui(S) = β Pr[Si ∈ C(S)]− α|Si|. (2)
2.1 The Greedy Approximation Algorithm
As an NP-complete problem, there is no known efficient set-cover algorithm that is
guaranteed to always return an optimal cover C [GJ79]. Here, we analyze two vari-
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ants of the simple greedy approximation algorithm, G (see Figure 1): a determinis-
tic version that always iterates through the collection of subsets S = (S1, . . . , Sm)
in a fixed order that is known by every agent; and a non-deterministic version
that iterates through S following a permutation π that is selected uniformly at
random from all permutations of 1, . . . , m. Through the remainder of this paper,
we will let Gd denote the deterministic greedy algorithm, and Gn denote the non-
deterministic greedy algorithm. Also, we will use SCIG(Gd) and SCIG(Gn) to
denote the set-cover instance games based on the algorithms Gd and Gn, respec-
tively.
We note that the greedy algorithm is guaranteed to return a cover that is at
most a O(logn) factor worse than optimal, which (assuming P 6= NP) is essentially
the best possible approximation one can get from a polynomial-time algorithm for
the set-cover problem [Hoc97, Vaz01, WS11].
3 Equilibrium Analysis
In this section we characterize the pure Nash equilibrium outcomes for the set-cover
instance game. Recall that a joint strategy S = (S1, . . . , Sm) is a pure strategy
Nash equilibrium if, for every agent i ∈M and every strategy S ′i ∈ S i,
ui(S) ≥ ui(S
′
i,S−i)
where S−i denotes the joint strategy of every agent j 6= i.
3.1 The Deterministic Case
Pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the SCIG based on the deterministic greedy
algorithm Gd consist exclusively of agents with zero or one-element strategies –
see Theorem 1 below. The basic intuition into why strategies with more that a
single element are not stable follows from observing two facts. First, as we show
in Lemma 1 below, no two agents i and j will share any common elements in a
Nash equilibrium. Because Gd is deterministic, if the strategies of both i and j
get selected then it will be the case that one of them is always selected before the
other. Therefore, the agent that is selected second can safely drop those common
elements and still ensure that their strategy is part of the cover returned by Gd.
The second fact is due to the definition of a Nash equilibrium – that an agent must
be playing their best-response strategy given all other agents’ strategies remaining
unchanged. Putting these two facts together, the best-response for an agent i
whose strategy Si is selected by Gd is to switch to the strategy S
′
i = {ek} for
some ek ∈ Si since ek is not going to be part of any other agent’s strategy in Nash
equilibrium and S ′i will still get chosen by Gd but at a lower cost.
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Theorem 1. In the SCIG(Gd), every Nash equilibrium strategy S has agents with
non-overlapping strategies. Moreover,
1. If α > β, then the only Nash equilibrium has Si = ∅ for all i ∈ M .
2. If β/2 ≤ α < β, then Nash equilibrium strategies have the first ℓ1 = min{m,n}
agents with distinct, single-element strategies and all remaining ℓ0 = max{0, m−
ℓ1} agents have empty strategies.
3. If α = β, then a Nash equilibrium strategy will involve up to n agents choos-
ing distinct, single-element strategies and all other agents choosing empty
strategies.
The proof of Theorem 1 is presented below. First, we establish the a couple
of lemmata. Lemma 1 establishes that in a Nash equilibrium, no two agents’
strategies share common elements; and Lemma 2 bounds the maximum size of an
agent i’s strategy Si in a Nash equilibrium to |Si| ≤ 1.
Lemma 1. A joint strategy S in which there exist a pair of (distinct) agents
i, j ∈M with Si ∩ Sj 6= ∅ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. If either Si is not selected in the cover returned by Gd then i can strictly
improve its utility by choosing the strategy Si = ∅, which would clearly share no
common elements with Sj . A symmetric argument holds for j if Sj is not selected
by Gd.
Suppose now that both Si and Sj are in the cover returned by Gd, and that Gd
selects Si before selecting Sj . Assume, without loss of generality, that Si∩Sj = {ek}
and no other subset contains ek. Since Gd selects Si before Sj (and Gd is picking
Sj on the merit of Sj ’s uncovered elements), then j can deviate to a strategy
S ′j = Sj \ {ek} and still be selected by Gd. Moreover, such a deviation would
increase j’s utility by α.
Lemma 2. There does not exist a Nash equilibrium strategy S in which there is
an agent i ∈M with |Si| > 1.
Proof. By Lemma 1, the elements in Si are not in any other agent’s strategy.
Therefore, i could select one element ek ∈ Si and deviate to the strategy S
′
i = {ek}
and still be selected by Gd and increase their utility by (|Si| − 1)α.
Given Propositions 1 and 2, we can now prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. Lemma 1 establishes that agents’ strategies do not share any
common elements in Nash equilibrium. Part 1 follows from the observation that
whenever α > β then the cost to an agent of adding even a single element to their
strategy is greater than the benefit they would get for being selected in a cover.
8
Similarly, part 3 addresses the case that the cost of a single element is equal
to the benefit that comes from being selected in a cover. It is easy to see that in
either case the best that an agent can hope to do is receive a utility of zero.
Finally, part 2 follows from Lemma 2 and the observation that when α < β, a
strategySi = {ek} with a distinct, single element ek that does not belong to any
other strategy (i.e., ek /∈ Sj for all j 6= i) yields a positive utility for agent i.
We wrap up the analysis of the SCIG(Gd) with the following theorem, estab-
lishing the non-existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium for a significant part
of the SCIG’s parameter space. The intuition behind its proof involves a coupling
of the pigeonhole principle (i.e., there are more agents then elements) with the
upper bound on strategy sizes given by Lemma 2.
Theorem 2. There does not exist a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium whenever
m > n and α < β/2.
Proof. Suppose, toward a contradiction, that S is a Nash equilibrium. From
Propositions 1 and 2, we know that if S includes an agent i with Si 6= ∅, then it
must be that |Si| = 1 and the element in Si cannot appear in any other Sj.
Since α < β/2, an agent with a single-element strategy receives a higher utility
than an agent with an empty strategy. Therefore, the joint strategy S must include
n = |U| agents with distinct, single-element strategies, with the remaining m−n =
|M | − |U| agents having empty strategies. However, such a strategy cannot be a
Nash equilibrium since an agent i with Si = ∅ can change to a strategy S
′
i = Sj∪Sk
for some pair of agents j, k ∈ M with |Sj| = |Sk| = 1, which will ensure their
selection by Gd, and earn i a higher utility:
ui(S
′
i,S−i) = β − 2α > 0 = ui(Si,S−i).
3.2 The Non-Deterministic Case
In the SCIG based on the non-deterministic greedy algorithm Gn, the range of
possible Nash equilibrium strategies is a bit richer than those based on the ver-
sion of the game using the deterministic greedy algorithm. These outcomes are
described in Theorem 3.
Our main insight into the SCIG(Gn) is captured in Lemma 3, which identifies
an interesting pressure driving best-response strategy selections and ruling out
the existence of Nash equilibrium for a large part of the game’s parameter space.
The basic idea is as follows: Suppose that there are more agents than elements,
and there is an agent i with a strategy Si such that, for all other agents j 6= i,
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|Sj| ≤ |Si| < |U|. If the probability that Gn selects Si for a cover is less than
one, then i could switch to a strategy S ′i that includes all of the elements in Si
and one additional element to increase their probability of being selected by Gn to
one. But now that S ′i is always selected by Gn, any agent j for whom Sj ∩ S
′
i 6= ∅
will be better off by switching to a strategy S ′j Sj \ S
′
i. This now allows i to
deviate to a third strategy S ′′i = {ek} consisting of only a single element ek ∈ S
′
i.
Since ek was unique to S
′
i after every other agent j dropped from their strategies
elements in S ′′i , it is therefore still unique to i’s strategy after switching to S
′′
i ,
which ensures that the probability that S ′′i is in a cover returned by Gn remains
one. This behavior is similar to what was observed in the SCIG(Gd) model, which
prevented agents from having strategies with more than a single element in a Nash
equilibrium. However, in the SCIG(Gd) model, there is the possibility of agents
having more than a single element in a Nash equilibrium. But in order for this to
happen, at least two agents i and j would need to choose strategies Si = Sj = U ;
see Corollary 1.
Theorem 3. In the SCIG(Gn), pure Nash equilibrium strategies are:
1. If m ≤ n and α ≤ β, then Nash equilibrium strategies will involve disjoint,
single-element subsets and/or empty subsets.
2. If m > n and α = β/2, then there are Nash equilibrium strategies in which
either:
• All agents have zero- or single-element strategies, and for every agent i
with a single-element strategy Si = {ek}, there exists exactly one other
agent j with Sj = {ek}; or
• All agents have single-element strategies with each element appearing in
either one or two individual strategies.
3. For positive integers ρ ≥ 2 satisfying m > ρn and β/(1 + ρ)n < α ≤ β/ρn,
then Nash equilibrium strategies will have ρ (or possibly ρ − 1 when ρ ≥ 3)
agents i with Si = U and the remaining m− ρ (or possibly m− ρ+ 1 when
ρ ≥ 3) agents j with Sj = ∅.
Lemma 3. When α < β/2 and m > n, if S is a Nash equilibrium and there exists
an agent i for whom 0 < Pr[Si ∈ C(S)] < 1 then it must be the case that Si = U .
Proof. Assume that S is a Nash equilibrium. Set µ = maxj∈M |Sj|, and denote
by Smax ⊂ S the set of strategies in S with cardinalities µ; that is, Smax = {Sj :
|Sj| = µ}. By definition, the greedy algorithm Gn will always select an element
from Smax in its first iteration.
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Suppose that 1 < µ < n and let Si ∈ Smax be one of these µ-cardinality
strategies. Since |Si| > 0, it must be the case that ui(S) ≥ 0 (otherwise S would
certainly not be a Nash equilibrium). From our assumption that Pr[Si ∈ C(S)] < 1,
we can infer that agent i’s utility is at most ui(S) ≤ β/2 − αµ. However, by
deviating to a strategy S ′i = Si ∪ {ek} for some arbitrary element ek ∈ U \ Si,
agent i can weakly increase their utility to ui(S
′
i,S−i) = β − (1 + µ)α ≥ ui(S),
contradicting our assumption that S was a Nash equilibrium.
Suppose instead that µ = n and let Si ∈ S \Smax be a strategy with cardinality
less than µ. In this case, Gn will never pick Si since the algorithm will halt after
picking an element from Smax in its first iteration. This contradicts our assumption
that Pr[Si ∈ C(S)] > 0.
The next corollary follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Corollary 1. If S is a Nash equilibrium in which there is at least one agent i with
Si = U , then for every other agent j either Sj = U or Sj = ∅.
We now turn to proving the main result of this section – Theorem 3.
Proof of Theorem 3. We start by proving part 1. If α < β, then all m agents
will choose a single element in their strategy, and since n ≥ m, no two agents
will choose the same element. If α = β, then agents will be indifferent between
choosing a single (distinct) element or an empty strategy since both yield the same
utility (zero).
For part 2, if α = β/2 then we can create a Nash equilibrium as follows:
Denoting the agents by M = {1, 2, . . . , m} and the universal set of elements by
U = {e1, e2, . . . , en}, set Si = Si+n = {ei} for agents i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. If i+ n > m
then just set Si = {ei}, and if m > 2n then, for the remaining agents j ∈ {2n, 2n+
1, . . . , m}, set Sj = ∅. It is easy to verify that this results in a Nash equilibrium
since no agent would stand to (strictly) gain by dropping their element (if they
have one), nor would they (strictly) gain by adding an additional element.
For part 3, fix a value for ρ ≥ 3. If S is a Nash equilibrium with exactly
ρ agents i with Si = U , then Gn selects a particular one of these subsets with
probability 1/ρ. In order for Si = U to be a best response given that at most
ρ − 1 other agents j have Sj = U , it must be the case that α ≤ β/ρn. (If there
are exactly ρ − 1 other agents j with Sj = U and α = β/ρn then agent i’s best
response could be either Si = U or Si = ∅.)
If ρ = 2, then the only Nash equilibrium for this regime is when there are
two agents i and j with Si = Sj = U . If instead there was only one agent i
with Si = U then they could deviate to the strategy S
′
i = {ek} for some arbitrary
element ek ∈ U and strictly increase their utility. (A similar argument holds for
why there is no Nash equilibrium for the case when ρ = 1.)
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Finally, from the preceding argument, Lemma 3, and Corollary 1, it follows
that, if m > 2n and α < β/2, any Nash equilibrium must include at least two
agents i and j with Si = Sj = U .
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper identified the notion of algorithm instance games (AIGs), referring
to game theoretic models (e.g., games and mechanisms) in which outcomes are
resolved from joint strategy profiles algorithmically. AIGs offer a perspective into
a fundamentally algorithmic aspect of game theory that has heretofore received
only incidental attention in isolated contexts. The primary conceptual contribution
of this paper is the explicit identification of AIGs, which we believe will appeal
to the broader interests of the algorithmic game theory community, presenting an
interesting topic for future research.
Our primary technical contribution involved the characterization of pure Nash
equilibrium strategies for two versions of the set-cover instance game (SCIG) – an
AIG based on the set-cover optimization problem. Both versions of this game uti-
lize the simple greedy algorithm for resolving outcomes from agents’ joint strategy
profiles. They differ in that in one version, which we denote by SCIG(Gd), the
greedy algorithm iterates according to a fixed ordering of the agents’ strategies,
and in the other, denoted SCIG(Gn), the greedy algorithm iterates according to
a permutation of agents’ strategies chosen uniformly at random. Our analysis of
these games demonstrate how a slight change in the outcome resolution algorithm
can lead to significantly different equilibrium predictions. Or, cast another way, our
findings show that agents’ knowledge of the greedy algorithm’s iteration sequence
a priori will have a material effect on the set of Nash equilibrium strategies.
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